I had pretensions to (limited) knowledge about India’s China war of 1962. “The Fractured Himalaya” by Nirupama Rao punctured that belief. This is, in my view, the best book written on the events that led to the war. The twists and turns of history had boxed the players into a situation where diplomacy could not prevent the outbreak of hostilities. More importantly, it diminished the stature of Nehru, and his elder-statesman aura among countries newly liberated from the colonial yoke.
The book deals with India’s relationship with the erstwhile Tibet and China’s entry into this mix with, avowedly, historical claims. In our eagerness not to upset the relationship with China (helped abundantly by some ill-thought-out advice by K M Panikkar, our then Ambassador to China) India had endorsed China’s annexation of Tibet in 1950. A period of camaraderie followed with many rounds of talks between Chinese Premier Chou En-Lai and Nehru. But by 1960, the relationship had deteriorated due to the road built by China across Aksai Chin region in Ladakh and Dalai Lama’s escape to India.
During those halcyon days, a note (555 pages long) was prepared by the External Affairs Ministry of India, which laid out our detailed claim to Aksai Chin in the west and NEFA area in the East (called South Tibet by China). While the area in Aksai Chin was historically a trade route of India, the Chinese had no historical claim to it. As far as the Eastern part is concerned, India was quick to lay claim to areas along Mc Mahon line as soon as the Chinese attacked and occupied Tibet. Until then the Tawang monastery and NEFA region were loosely administered, with blurring lines of Indian and Tibetan control. Unfortunately, the same alacrity was not shown in the Western region in Aksai Chin where India had prior knowledge of Chinese road building activities- but were ill prepared to extend patrols to that area.
This book reaffirms the theory that it was a war that was, on detailed analysis, fired by Nehru’s penchant for transparency, which he earnestly weaved into India's newly established democracy. The media, legislature and public opinion fuelled that fire and positioned India at a place where diplomacy could not save the day. The book doesn’t deal with the war much. But India’s strong Tibet links, Dalai Lama’s escape to India and China’s occupation of Tibet (and India’s rather speedy acquiescence to it) are events outlined well in this book. For instance, India wasn’t quite concerned that Tawang monastery was, in a sense, under the Tibetan tutelage (in a theological sense) and was even paying taxes to Lhasa. India woke up to the fact that China occupied Tibet and recognized the need to occupy patrolling points along the Mc Mahon line. The line itself being a product of the Tripartite conference between, British India, China, and Tibet, which was then a region under Chinese suzerainty, a term which no one understood much; it was more of a feudal concept.
This writer heard Neville Maxwell’s lecture in Australian National University in Canberra in 2009. His book on the subject was well written, and not so complimentary to the Indian Political/ military leadership. He had eventually turned into an apologist of China. But the essential premise of his book was that India fought a noisy battle in the media and parliament. The Chinese were silent observers, waiting for practical adjustments to a colonial border. But they were also biding their time to strike.
Rao’s book gives a detailed background to the conflict. Cartographic details are omitted for easy reading. But it leaves the reader guessing what could be a solution to this long-standing conflict. Now that the entire dispute is linked to the Pakistan problem too, it has become intractable and permanent. There are signs that we missed the opportunity to give up our claims to Aksai Chin in return for recognition of the Mc Mahon line along the eastern sector. Unfortunately, that ship has sailed. India’s speedy recognition of China’s occupation of Tibet, our silence on the repression in Tibet in 1959 (which, even Ayub Khan, the military dictator next door, asked of India to jointly oppose), India’s support for China’s membership in UN (at the cost of Taiwan) and even their admittance to permanent membership of security council, have all eventually turned to naught: gestures which didn’t count for friendship between two huge post-colonial powers.
China is today the new imperialist power. They will continue to lay claim to Tawang and Arunachal Pradesh, while continuing to occupy Aksai Chin. A negotiated settlement doesn’t look likely in the light of contemporary geopolitics. The only way we can hold on with the LAC is by increased economic and military power. At least until something miraculous happens; an accommodative, benign China and an India that is bold enough to compromise for peace. The present regime is going about silently about the happenings in the LAC. I wish Nehru had done that in the 1950s and 60s, without falling victim to the noise.
